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Competition Policy Review: Draft Recommendations on Competition Laws 
By  
Stephen Corones 
Queensland University of Technology, Member, Centre for Commercial and Property Law 
Introduction 
On 4 December 2013, the Prime Minister and the Minister for Small Business announced a 
“root and branch” review of Australia’s competition policy. The Minister for Small Business 
released the final Terms of Reference for the competition policy review on 27 March 2014, 
following consultation with the States and Territories, and announced the Review Panel 
headed by Professor Ian Harper.1 Under the terms of reference the Competition Policy 
Review Committee (the Harper Committee) is required to focus on three broad areas: 
• examining what can be done to create more competition in service areas such as 
health, education and intellectual property; 
• considering whether the structure and powers of the competition institutions (the 
ACCC , the NCC, the Tribunal and the AER) remain appropriate; and 
• examining the effectiveness of the competition provisions of the Competition and 
Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) (CCA) and laying down a broad framework through which 
the law can be streamlined and reformed over time.2 
The Harper Committee released its Draft Report on 22 September 2014 (the Draft Report).3 
Its Final Report is due in March 2015. 
The last major inquiry into competition policy in Australia was that conducted by the 
Independent Committee of Inquiry established by then Prime Minister, Mr Paul Keating, in 
October 1992. The Independent Committee of Inquiry, headed by Professor Fred Hilmer, 
had, as its principal task, making recommendations to reform regulation that unjustifiably 
restricted competition and improving productivity, with competition being seen as “a positive 
force that assists economic growth and job creation”.4 The Harper Review Committee has 
also been given the task of making recommendations on appropriate reforms to improve the 
Australian economy “…by identifying and removing impediments to competition that are not 
                                                                 
1 The terms of reference are available at http://competitionpolicyreview.gov.au/. 
2 See Competition Policy Issues Paper (14 April  2014), at 
http://competitionpolicyreview.gov.au/consultation/issues-paper/. 
3 See Competition Policy Review Draft Report (September 2014), at 
http://competitionpolicyreview.gov.au/consultation/draft-report/. 
4 Report by the Independent Committee of Inquiry, National Competition Policy (AGPS, Canberra, 1993) 
(Hilmer Report), p xv. 
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in the long-term interest of consumers or the public interest.”5 In this sense, the Harper 
Review Committee’s Final Report will be seen as “Hilmer Mark II”.  
The goal of making markets work in the long-term interests of consumers is reflected in 
many of the draft recommendations in Chapter 8 of the Draft Report, “Regulatory 
Restrictions.” Draft recommendation 52 in relation to pharmacies, provides: 
“… the Panel does not consider that current restrictions on ownership and location or 
pharmacies are necessary to ensure the quality of advice and care provided to patients. 
Such restrictions limit the ability of consumers to choose where to obtain pharmacy 
products and services, and the ability of providers to meet consumers’ preferences”.6  
It is also reflected in the Harper Panel’s draft recommendation that the taxi industry is in need 
of reform, and that: “[m]any restrictions remain that limit competition by creating barriers to 
entry and preventing innovation”.7 Accordingly, draft recommendation 6 provides: 
“States and Territories should remove regulations that restrict competition in the taxi 
industry, including from services that compete with taxis, except where it would not 
be in the public interest. If restrictions on numbers of taxi licences are to be retained, 
the number to be issued should be determined by independent regulators focused on 
the interests of consumers”.8 
The focus of this article, however, is not on the draft recommendations in relation to 
regulatory restrictions, but on those Chapters of the Draft Report dealing with “Competition 
Laws” and the key recommendations for reform in this area. 
General principles 
The object of Pt 4 of the Draft Report is to assess whether Australia’s competition laws 
contained in Part IV of the CCA “…remain fit for purpose having regard to consumer and 
business experience with the laws, changes that have occurred in the Australian economy and 
that are anticipated, and relevant international developments”.9 In making its assessment the 
Harper Panel adopted the following guiding principles: 
• that competition policy should foster choice and increased responsiveness to 
consumers; 
• that competition policy is not designed to support a particular number of competitors 
or to protect individual competitors, but rather is designed to ensure that the behaviour 
of competitors does not damage the competitive process to the detriment of 
consumers; 
• that competition law should be simple, predictable and reliable;  
                                                                 
5 Competition Policy Review Draft Report, Terms of Reference, p 300. 
6 Competition Policy Review Draft Report, p 69. 
7 Competition Policy Review Draft Report, p 139. 
8 Competition Policy Review Draft Report, p 30. 
9 Competition Policy Review Draft Report, p 187. 
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• that competition law should keep pace with international best practice; and  
• that the policies and systems should be adaptable to changing economic 
circumstances.10 
While Pt 4 of the Draft Report contains the Harper Panel’s analysis of Australia’s 
competition laws, Ch 3 of the Draft Report summarises the draft recommendations. The 
principal draft recommendations will now be considered in the light of the Panel’s chosen 
guiding principles. 
Cartels 
The Panel considered that there are significant deficiencies in the current framework. In 
particular, they are excessively complex and in this regard do not comply with the third 
guiding principle. 
Draft recommendation 22 provides:  
 “The prohibitions against cartel conduct should be simplified and the following specific 
changes made: 
• the provisions should apply to cartel conduct affecting goods or services supplied 
or acquired in Australian markets; 
• the provisions ought to be confined to conduct involving firms that are actual 
competitors and not firms for whom competition is a mere possibility; 
• a broad exemption should be included for joint ventures and similar forms of 
business collaboration…recognising that such conduct will be prohibited by 
section 45 of the CCA if it has the purpose, effect or likely effect of substantially 
lessening competition;  
• an exemption should be included for trading restrictions that are imposed by one 
firm on another in connection with the supply or acquisition of goods or services 
(including IP licensing), recognising that such conduct will be prohibited by 
section 47…if it has the purpose, effect or likely effect of substantially lessening 
competition”.11 
Exclusionary provisions 
As regards exclusionary provisions, the Panel considered that as defined in s 4D of the CCA, 
the conduct is materially the same cartel conduct in the form of market sharing, and 
accordingly, the prohibition against exclusionary provisions should be removed from the 
CCA. 
 
 
                                                                 
10 Competition Policy Review Draft Report, p 187-8. 
11 Competition Policy Review Draft Report, p 41. 
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Anti-competitive agreements 
As regards the anti-competitive disclosure of information, the Panel is of the view that the 
price signalling provisions in Pt IV, Div 1A of the CCA should be repealed and that a new 
concept of a “concerted practice” be introduced into s 45 of the CCA to catch this kind of 
conduct. The concept of a “concerted practice” is defined broadly to mean “a regular and 
deliberate activity undertaken by two or more firms”.12 The new provision would catch such 
conduct occurring in all parts of the economy, not just the banking sector to which Pt IV, Div 
1A of the CCA currently applies.  
The definition of “concerted practice” may require some refinement. The Draft Report states 
that: “[i]t would include the regular discourse or exchange of price information between two 
firms, whether or not it is possible to show that the firms have reached an understanding 
about the discourse or exchange”.13 This suggests that there is no need to demonstrate a 
commitment by at least one party to do something in the future, and that the price information 
exchange arrangements that were at issue in Trade Practices Commission v Email,14 and 
Apco Service Stations Pty Ltd v ACCC,15(mere sharing of price information without a 
commitment to follow prices), would be caught by s 45 as concerted practices if they had the 
purpose, effect or likely effect of substantially lessening competition. 
Draft recommendation 24 provides:  
“the ‘price signalling’ provisions of Division 1A of the CCA are not fit for purpose in 
their current form and should be repealed. Section 45 should be extended to cover 
concerted practices which have the purpose, or would have or be likely to have the 
effect, of substantially lessening competition”. 
Misuse of market power  
The Harper Panel’s terms of reference are very wide, but the topic that has attracted the most 
attention, in terms of the number of submissions received, is the fitness for purpose of CCA, s 
46. Draft recommendation 25, provides: 
“ …the primary prohibition in section 46 should be re-framed to prohibit a 
corporation that has a substantial degree of power in a market from engaging in 
conduct if the proposed conduct has the purpose, or would have or be likely to have 
the effect, of substantially lessening competition in that or any other market”.  
Draft recommendation 25 also contains a new substantive defence. The primary prohibition 
would not apply if the conduct in question: 
 
“would be a rational business decision or strategy by a corporation that did not have a 
substantial degree of power in the market; and 
                                                                 
12 Competition Policy Review Draft Report, p 230. 
13 Competition Policy Review Draft Report, p 229. 
14 Trade Practices Commission v Email (1980) 43 FLR 383. 
15 Apco Service Stations Pty Ltd v ACCC (2005) ATPR ¶42-078. 
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the effect or likely effect of the conduct is to benefit the long-term interests of 
consumers”. 
 
Draft recommendation 25 fixes two defects in the drafting of CCA, s 46(1): first, the primary 
prohibition makes clear that it is competition that is to be protected, not competitors; and 
secondly, the defence makes clear that, ultimately, the aim of s 46 is to protect the long-term 
interest of consumers. 
 
The primary prohibition differs from the current CCA, s 46(1) in two important respects. 
First, it removes the “taking advantage” element from the primary prohibition; and secondly, 
it introduces an effects- based analytical model. The primary prohibition in draft 
recommendation 25, places the onus on the applicant to prove two elements: first, the 
threshold test of a substantial degree of market power, which is unchanged from the present 
prohibition in CCA, s 46(1); and secondly, that the purpose, effect, or likely effect of the 
conduct would be to substantially lessen competition in that or any other market. As regards 
the second element, the effects based analytical model is well-established in relation to CCA, 
ss 45, 47 and 50. These substantive prohibitions adopt the same effects-based analytical 
model for establishing liability as that proposed in draft recommendation 25.  
 
The exclusionary effect of the conduct is to be assessed by comparing its effect on the 
competitive process “with” and “without” the conduct. The framework that would be used to 
assess the effect of the conduct on competition would be that of the structure-conduct- 
performance paradigm with a strong focus on the structural checklist of factors in Re 
QCMA.16 In that case the Tribunal adopted a structuralist approach for determining the 
competitive impact of a firm’s conduct. This approach requires first that the relevant market 
be defined, and then the structural features of the market be identified.17 The focus is on 
market power and changes in market power as a result of the conduct at issue. Conduct harms 
competition in a market if it creates or enhances market power. Market power is assessed in 
terms of the competitive constraints, or lack of competitive constraints, on the particular firm 
whose conduct is being scrutinised. The Tribunal's structuralist approach for determining the 
effect of conduct on competition in a market has been adopted by Federal Court judges,18 and 
by the Full Federal Court in a number of cases.19 Thus, it cannot be claimed that the proposed 
primary prohibition does not comply with the guiding principle that it should be “predictable 
and reliable”. 
                                                                 
16 Re Queensland Co-operative Milling Association Ltd and Defiance Holdings (1976) 25 FLR 169. 
17 Re Queensland Co-operative Milling Association Ltd and Defiance Holdings (1976) 25 FLR 169 at 188-189. 
18 See, for example, TPC v Ansett Transport Industries (Operations) Pty Ltd (1978) 32 FLR 305 at 325 (Northrop 
J); Mark Lyons Pty Ltd v Bursill Sportsgear Pty Ltd  (1987) ATPR ¶40-809 at 48,797 (Wilcox J); and TPC v 
Australia Meat Holdings Pty Ltd (1988) ATPR ¶40-876 at 49,480 (Wilcox J) . 
19 See, for example, Outboard Marine Australia Pty Ltd v Hecar Investments No 6 Pty Ltd (1982) 66 FLR 120 at 
123 (Bowen CJ and Fisher J); Arnotts Limited v Trade Practices Commission (1990) 24 FCR 313 at 336 (Lockhart, 
Wilcox and Gummow JJ); and Seven Network Limited v News Limited (2009) 182 FCR 160 at 282-3 [582] 
(Dowsett and Lander JJ). 
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This is a significant improvement on CCA, s 46(1), where the focus is on the “taking 
advantage” element. The words “taking advantage” have proved to be confusing to the courts 
and difficult to apply in practice.20 Under the taking advantage element the court is required 
to hypothesise about what a firm without market power could, or would be likely to do, if it 
were operating in a workably competitive environment, rather than focussing on the actual 
exclusionary, anti-competitive effects of the conduct at issue. 
 
In relation to the defence in draft recommendation 25, there is some uncertainty as to its 
scope. The first limb of the defence is that the conduct would be a rational business decision 
or strategy if the respondent were operating under competitive conditions. This appears to re-
instate the “taking advantage” element of the existing s 46(1); however, as a substantive 
defence, the onus of proof is placed on the corporation engaging in the conduct. The obvious 
argument in favour of imposing the onus of proof on the corporation engaging in the conduct 
is that it will be in the best position to know the reason why it engaged in the conduct. If the 
conduct can be explained as being a rational business decision, and it is the sort of conduct 
one would expect to find under competitive conditions, it should be permissible.  
 
Under the proposed defence the respondent must also prove, on the balance of probabilities, 
that “the effect or likely effect of the conduct is to benefit the long-term interests of 
consumers”. Some uncertainty, or lack of predictability, arises as regards the second element 
of the defence. It is designed to ensure that a “rational business decision or strategy” that only 
gives rise to short-term benefits to consumers, does not escape the net of s 46 if, in the long 
term, it is likely to have the effect of harming consumers.   
 
The second limb of the defence may give rise to problems of proof. How are the short-term 
benefits to be measured? How is the long-term harm to consumers to be measured? Is it 
envisaged that the respondent will make an assessment about future outcomes and estimate 
what the likely efficiencies and costs will be? Will it be sufficient if there is some factual 
basis for the efficiency claims without attempting to quantify them? The ACCC and the 
Tribunal have experience in relation to these issues in the context of the authorisation process 
under the CCA. As the original Trade Practices Act was conceived, it was envisaged that this 
type of economically complex, cost/ benefit analysis would be performed by the 
administrative agencies (the Commission and, on appeal, the Tribunal), rather than the courts. 
The Panel is seeking further submissions on the scope of the defence, and whether it is 
workable.  
Draft recommendation 25 complies with the fourth guiding principle that Australia’s 
competition law should keep pace with international best practice. The need to adopt an 
                                                                 
20 See Competition Policy Review Draft Report, p 209 for a discussion of some cases that i l lustrate the 
difficulties encountered by the courts. 
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effects based analytical model in relation to the unilateral conduct of firms with substantial 
market power has been recognised as essential in both the United States and the EU. It was 
recognised by Scalia J in Eastman Kodak Co v Image Technical Services Inc., who stated: 
 
“Where a defendant maintains substantial market power, his activities are 
examined through a special lens: Behaviour that might not be of concern to the 
antitrust laws – or that might be viewed as pro-competitive – can take on 
exclusionary connotation when practised by a monopolist”.21 
It was also recognised by the European Court of Justice (ECJ) in relation to the EU 
equivalent provision to CCA, s 46(1) which prohibits an abuse of a dominant position.  In 
Hoffmann-La Roche v Commission of the European Communities the ECJ stated: 
The concept of an abuse is an objective concept relating to the behaviour of an 
undertaking in a dominant position which is such as to influence the structure 
of the market where, as a result of the very presence of the undertaking in 
question, the degree of competition is weakened and which, through recourse 
to methods different from those which condition normal competition… has the 
effect of hindering the maintenance of the degree of competition still existing 
in the market or the growth of that competition.22 
Two additional recommendations in relation to misuse of market power are worthy of note. 
First, draft recommendation 18 recommends the removal of ss 46A and 46B, misuse of 
market power in a trans-Tasman market, as being unnecessary or redundant.23 
Secondly, the Panel considers the range of remedies available for a misuse of market power is 
sufficient to deter a firm from engaging in such conduct and that a divestiture remedy is not 
necessary to address market power concerns.24 
Vertical restrictions (other than Resale Price Maintenance) 
Many vertical restrictions (involving parties at different levels in the supply chain) are pro-
competitive. They generate investments that would not otherwise occur and enhance 
consumer welfare. This was recognised by the Harper Panel which stated: “[u]sually, vertical 
trading restrictions are unlikely to cause any significant competitive harm”.25 A number of 
submissions recommended that s 47 should be deleted and that vertical restrictions should be 
prohibited only if they contravened s 45 of the CCA. The Panel recommended that s 47 
should be retained, because s 45 only catches restrictions in agreements to supply or acquire; 
                                                                 
21 Eastman Kodak Co v Image Technical Services Inc  504 US 451 (1992) at 488. 
22 Hoffmann-La Roche v Commission of the European Communities [1979] ECR 461. 
23 Competition Policy Review Draft Report, p 39. 
24 Competition Policy Review Draft Report, p 211. 
25 Competition Policy Review Draft Report, p 230. 
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it does not catch refusals to supply. However, the Panel made two significant 
recommendations in relation to s 47. 
Draft recommendation 27 provides that third-line forcing, which is currently prohibited per 
se, should only be prohibited if it has the purpose, effect or likely effect of substantially 
lessening competition.26 This complies with guiding principle four, that competition law 
should keep pace with international best practice. Australia is the only country that prohibits 
third-line forcing per se. The US, EU, Canada and New Zealand all apply competition-based 
tests. It is now widely accepted that per se treatment should be reserved for horizontal 
arrangements.  
Draft recommendation 28 provides that s 47 should apply to all forms of vertical conduct 
rather than specified types of vertical conduct and that its drafting be simplified.27 
Resale Price Maintenance  
In relation to Resale Price Maintenance the Harper Panel adopts a conservative approach. 
Draft recommendation 29 provides: 
“The prohibition on resale price maintenance (RPM) should be retained in its current 
from as a per se prohibition, but the notification process should be extended to 
include resale price maintenance. The prohibition should also be amended to include 
an exemption for RPM conduct between related bodies corporate, as is the case under 
section 45 and 47”. 
It should be noted that there has only been one successful application for the authorisation of 
RPM since authorisation became available for RPM in 1995. On 21 October 2014, the ACCC 
issued a draft determination proposing to grant conditional authorisation to Tooltechnic 
Systems (Aust) Pty Ltd to set minimum retail prices on Festool power tools for three years.28 
The Harper Panel acknowledged that RPM is now emerging as an issue for new models of 
digital-based retailing.29 In the digital economy free-rider effects have become a more 
significant problem for manufacturers and suppliers. 
Mergers 
The Harper Review Committee’s assessment was that overall the merger provisions of the 
CCA are working effectively and it did not recommend any changes to the substantive law. 
However, a matter of considerable concern for the business community is the need to 
streamline the merger approval processes. Parties seeking approval before they merge 
                                                                 
26 Competition Policy Review Draft Report, p 45. 
27 Competition Policy Review Draft Report, p 46. 
28 The ACCC’s Tooltechnic Systems (Aust) Pty Ltd determination is available in its public register at: 
http://registers.accc.gov.au/content/index.phtml/itemId/1179445/fromItemId/278039 
29 Competition Policy Review Draft Report, p 234-5. 
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currently have three different processes available to them to avoid the risk of court action: 
• informal merger clearance from the ACCC; 
• formal merger clearance from the ACCC; and  
• merger authorisation from the Tribunal. 
The Panel noted that many submissions were directed to these approval processes and that it 
had weighed the various proposals for change.30  
As regards the informal merger clearance process, the Panel recognised that it works well in 
mergers that are not contentious, and they are generally given an informal clearance within 
four to six weeks. However, some stakeholders considered that the ACCC’s informal merger 
clearance processes are not timely and lack transparency. This means that in more complex 
and contentious cases the ACCC takes many months to reach a decision.  
The issue here relates to the availability of the necessary data to make a decision. Both sides 
have an incentive to withhold data. The ACCC claims that it could reach a decision more 
quickly if it had better data from the applicant, and that delays occur because it cannot reach 
the correct decision until it has the necessary data. The business community claims that the 
issue is one of transparency rather than timeliness. In particular, the applicant should have 
access to the data contained in third party submissions, and it is unfair to require the applicant 
to provide its data if the ACCC withholds data. Procedural fairness requires that the applicant 
have the opportunity to respond to all of the data in the ACCC’s possession.  
However, the Panel was not convinced by these arguments and considered that “…it is not 
sensible to attempt to regulate an informal process which, by definition, operates outside any 
formal legal framework”.31 Nevertheless, the Panel considered that there was scope for 
further consultation between the ACCC and the business community for developing the 
informal review process to deliver more timely decisions. 
As regards the formal merger clearance process, the Panel considered that “…the existence of 
a formal merger clearance option serves a useful purpose even if it is seldom used, since it 
provides a time-limited, accessible alternative to the ACCC’s informal clearance process”.32  
The most significant draft recommendation in relation to mergers is to combine the formal 
merger clearance process and the merger authorisation process. In addition, the Panel 
considers that it is undesirable that merger authorisation applications be taken directly to the 
Tribunal, by-passing the ACCC, and that the ACCC should be the first instance decision 
maker.33 Draft recommendation 30 provides:  
“…the ACCC should be empowered to approve a merger if it is satisfied that the 
merger does not substantially lessen competition or if it is satisfied that the merger 
results in public benefits that outweigh the anti-competitive detriments... 
                                                                 
30 Competition Policy Review Draft Report, p 200. 
31 Competition Policy Review Draft Report, p 201. 
32 Competition Policy Review Draft Report, p 202. 
33 Competition Policy Review Draft Report, p 204. 
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Decisions of the ACCC should be subject to review by the Australian Competition 
Tribunal under a process that is also governed by strict timelines.”34  
The Harper Panel’s recommendations in this regard follow the New Zealand model. They are 
sensible and are likely to be met with positive support from the business community. 
Intellectual Property  
The Harper Review Committee acknowledged that new technologies foster innovation which, 
in turn, fosters productivity and growth in living standards. Accordingly, access to 
intellectual property (IP) will become increasingly important in the digital age. The Panel 
recognised that Australia’s IP rights regime is a priority area for review. It made two 
important draft recommendations in relation to intellectual property. 
Draft recommendation 7 provides that “…an overarching review of intellectual property be 
undertaken by an independent body, such as the Productivity Commission”. Draft 
recommendation 8 provides that s 51(3) of the CCA, the intellectual property exception, 
should be repealed. 35 
Enforcement and Remedies  
The Harper Review Committee recognised that private enforcement is an important 
complement to enforcement by the ACCC.  The Harper Panel recognised that there are a 
number of impediments faced by private litigants bringing private enforcement proceedings. 
Section 83 of the CCA is intended to facilitate private actions by enabling findings of fact 
made against a corporation in one proceeding (an action by the ACCC) to be prima facie 
evidence against the corporation in another proceeding (a follow-on action by a private 
litigant that has suffered loss or damage caused by the corporation’s conduct). Many ACCC 
proceedings are resolved by the defendant making admissions to the ACCC, and it is unclear 
whether s 83 applies to the making of such admissions.36 
Draft recommendation 37 provides: 
“Section 83 should be amended so that it extends to admissions of fact made by the 
person against whom the proceedings are brought in addition to findings of facts 
made by the court”. 
Conclusion 
The Harper Review Committee’s draft recommendations to amend the competition laws are 
to be welcomed. They seek to clarify and streamline Australia’s competition laws which have 
been the subject of amendments in the past which were drafted in a prescriptive, inflexible 
                                                                 
34 Competition Policy Review Draft Report, p 49. 
35 Competition Policy Review Draft Report, p 31. 
36 Doubts about whether s 83 extends to admitted facts were expressed in ACCC v ABB Transmission and 
Distribution Limited (No 3) (2002) ATPR 41-872 at [51] (Finkelstein J) and ACCC v Leahy Petroleum Pty Ltd (No 
3) (2002) ATPR ¶ 42-052 at [118] (Goldberg J). Cf ACCC v Mailpost Australia Limited (2010) ATPR ¶42-315 at 
[22] (Foster J) and ACCC v Jurlique International Pty Ltd (2007) ATPR ¶42-146 at [8]-[9] (Spender J). 
 
11 | P a g e  
 
style that can be counter-productive. The draft recommendations correct many of these 
drafting anomalies. In particular, they emphasise that the aim of the competition laws is to 
enhance consumer welfare over the long term. Their primary focus should be on the effect of 
conduct on the competitive process, rather than individual competitors.  
The Hawke-Keating era, which implemented the recommendations of the Hilmer Committee, 
has defined sound competition policy and good economic management ever since. Whether 
the current Coalition Government will have the political courage to implement the Harper 
Panel recommendations (“Hilmer Mark II”) remains to be seen. 
 
 
